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Introduction
In Yemen, we have seen an increase in the prominence of al-Qaeda as it exploits the country's security, economic, and social challenges. The threat to Yemen, to the region, and, indeed, to the U.S. homeland posed by what is now called "al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) has been demonstrated by suicide bombers trying to carry out operations in Yemen's capital, by the attempt to assassinate the Assistant Minister of Interior of Saudi Arabia, and by the attempted bombing of the U.S. airliner on Christmas Day.
-GEN David Petraeus, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony In January 2014, after a series of missed deadlines, the NDC finally announced the creation of a federal system in Yemen. This agreement is intended to reverse the almost systematic marginalization of Southern Yemenis, an unfortunate side effect of a poorly planned unification in 1990 and the subsequent but brief bloody civil war in 1994. Decentralizing political power under a federal system will give the new federal states a significantly increased measure of independence in political and economic affairs, while still keeping them united together under the nation of Yemen.
While a federal system does allow for greater autonomy of the newly established federal units, it does so at some potential risk. Decoupling the units from the central government could lead to an initial decrease in the security situation, as the government's control and ability to provide security will decline.
Consequently it may provide additional breathing space for anti-government forces such as the Huthi in the north, and AQAP-affiliated elements in the south, allowing them to cement their gains and expand their power. 3 Although Al-Hiraak was represented at the NDC, the core of the movement steadfastly refused to participate in any negotiations short of full independence. 4 These core Al-Hiraak are unlikely to be satisfied with the newly granted federal status, while those who resist the movement fear that federal status is merely one step closer to full independence from the north. None of these statements explicitly acknowledge the existence of a politically legitimate secession movement, let alone hint at the causal factors that underpin Al-Hiraak. In order to truly understand the many internal issues in Yemen, attention must be paid to this roiling secession movement.
Ongoing United States policy towards Yemen focuses primarily on countering the growth and influence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). State Department and CENTCOM statements explicitly proffer support for national unification under some form of federal system. They expressly link all of the destabilizing factors in Yemen to a rising AQAP presence and ongoing Iranian influence. In doing so, they inadvertently group any element opposed to the status quo government in Yemen with violent extremist elements. This approach ignores the legitimate grievances of the Al-Hiraak movement, and by marginalizing their position, runs the risk of pushing them towards AQAP.
8
Although the decision to move to a federal system was driven in no small part by the political and economic concerns of Al-Hiraak and the largely disenfranchised southern population, this decision is also likely to further stabilize the country by denying AQAP additional political space and resource support. The shift from central to federal state control will likely reduce the ability of Yemen to maintain its internal security, at least in the short term. However, by addressing many of the grievances that led to the formation of Al-Hiraak, the new federal system will provide an increasingly responsive and flexible 6 United States Department of State (DOS), "US Support for Yemen Fact Sheet," accessed November 17, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/212649.htm. 7 CENTCOM, 2013. 8 Stephen Day, "Yemen: On the Brink, " Middle East Program no. 108 (2010), 11. government that will better address the concerns of the southern population, and minimize the friction and discontent that AQAP needs to expand its operations. In order to explore this topic, I will lay out a methodology of approach, flesh out a literature review of contentious politics, conduct a case study of Yemen following the decision to federalize, and finally close with some recommendations for future policy.
Methodology
This study will be completed through a single case study of the Al-Hiraak movement in Yemen.
Examining this particular movement through the lens of contentious politics (specifically the ideas of repression and co-optation) during the uneasy history of unification of the country and the rise of the AlHiraak movement should provide some predictive value to understand how the move to a federal system will alter the movement itself. This study will also shed some light on how this federal system is likely to affect the growth of AQAP in Yemen.
Conducting a single case study intentionally limits the breadth of application of this project, and instead commits to an in-depth examination of one particular phenomenon. While this may at first glance appear limiting, it is the most appropriate manner in which to address the topic. John Gerring, a political science professor from Boston University, argues that a case study is best defined as "…the intensive study of a single unit wherever the aim is to shed light on a question pertaining to a broader class of units."
9 Therefore, an intensive study of one particular secession movement as related to United
States foreign policy may in fact shed light on other similar movements across the globe.
To be sure, the nature of the movement in Yemen possesses many unique characteristics that may not be found in other secession movements. But by examining this single set of particular characteristics, it is possible to draw inferences that may inform United States policy towards Yemen. The inferences drawn from the study may also be applicable to a broader set of units, or they may turn out to be unique to this particular case study. Even if the study proves to be applicable only to the situation in Yemen, there is value in scholarship that seeks to describe simply one unit of study.
Single unit research designs provide the opportunity to derive descriptive inferences from the case in question. They allow for a bounded, in depth examination of a particular phenomenon, which will be of limited applicability to other cases, but provide significant insight into a particular case.
10 They provide information that may be comparable to other similar cases, but not necessarily representative.
11
So for example, a case study of the Al-Hiraak movement in Yemen will provide significant information that describes this particular movement, in its particular environment. The case study may be compared to that of another secession movement, for example that of Scotland from the United Kingdom. Comparing the two cases may provide some interesting similarities, but it is not likely that the causal factors found in
Yemen can directly represent those in Scotland.
Academically, single unit case studies provide a better opportunity for exploratory research, or the quest for new theories. New theories most easily arrive from the examination of individual case studies, as academics work to identify the specific independent variables and causal mechanisms that may help explain their theories. These theories must then be subjected to multiple confirmatory tests, tests that draw upon a much larger number of cases. 12 This characteristic of case study designs makes it particularly applicable to political (and military) practitioners. If one accepts the premise that a policy directive or military campaign plan is in reality nothing more than a hypothesis, an explanation of a particular phenomenon that will be tested through real world application, then the use of single unit case studies should provide the best manner in which to derive these hypotheses. Because a case study is bounded to one particular unit, those examining it are at liberty to be very subjective in their generation of hypotheses. They do not have to be beholden to a large number of cases, which may present fewer 10 Ibid., 347.
11 Ibid., 348.
12 Ibid., 350.
potential hypotheses to explore. Therefore they are free to explore different approaches to the particular case.
13

Literature Review
This project will begin with a review of the literature surrounding the growth of Al-Hiraak in
Yemen. It will then briefly review the literature on secession movements, and United States policy towards secession movements in order to provide some context for the upcoming case study. Finally, the study will review the literature on social movement theory and the development of the field of contentious politics.
The Al-Hiraak Movement
Current literature about the Al-Hiraak movement in Yemen tends to categorize the secession movement as a result of two major causal factors. First, it indicates that practices instituted in the country following the 1994 civil war grossly favored northern interests. This inequality eventually led to the rise of the Al-Hiraak movement, whose initial claims sought only to promote southern interests and rectify inequality. President Saleh's heavy-handed repression of the early movement, and his administration's refusal to grant any significant concessions to the south, served as the second factor leading to the secessionist movement. These responses ultimately led Al-Hiraak to modify their demands from correction of inequality to a call for complete independence. 
Secession
There appears to be a definite lack of a unified theory on the right (or lack thereof) of a region to secede. Because political, ethnic, religious, economic, and international interests all may play a role in possible secession, it is almost impossible to reduce the phenomenon to one particular theory. Allen Buchanan understands the difficult nature of classifying secessionist movements because of these factors, and instead attempts to lay out moral arguments both supporting and rejecting the right to secede.
Buchanan, the James B. Duke Professor of philosophy at Duke University, examines more than 12 pro-secessionist arguments in an attempt to test for morality, all of which go beyond the simple "right of self-determination" argument that is usually used to justify that type of movement.
19 Of these arguments, he classifies five as morally justifiable bases for secession: self-defense, cultural preservation, limited goals of political association, rectificatory justice, and the avoidance of discriminatory redistribution.
20
In examining the arguments against secession, he finds only a few that meet the criteria of a moral argument. These include the right of self defense (in a case where the existence of the rump state is legitimately threatened either physically or economically by the secessionist region), soft paternalism (in which it is clear that the secessionist region will significantly restrict the civil liberties of its constituency), and the rectification of discriminatory redistribution. 
Contentious Politics
To begin an examination of Al-Hiraak through the lens of contentious politics, it is helpful to examine the development of social movement theory. This approach should start with some of the earliest thoughts on the drivers and characteristics of social movements, indicate the gaps present in these fields, and explain how they have led to the broader field of contentious politics.
Herbert Blumer, an American pioneer in social research, begin addressing the idea of collective behavior as a whole as a factor of grievances. Traditionally, scholars have examined collective behavior as being a result of either deprivation or social marginalization. Deprivation is generally defined as poverty or the denial of political rights, and is particularly linked with collective behavior when it is relative to another rival group. Social marginalization occurs when a portion of the population becomes somehow disconnected from meaningful relationships with other people, and the social and political institutions upon which they have come to rely. Social unrest plays a role in motivating social movements as well. Post World War II theorists such as Durkheim, Hoffer, and Kornhauser believed that social movements themselves could be driven by feelings of alienation and social disorganization. 30 This unrest often develops slowly as a result of the traditional grievances that are thought to be behind collective behavior. But Blumer sees social unrest as a sort of 'background' to the rise of collective behavior, rather than a direct cause. He believes that it is not until individuals who serve as agitators stir up enough dissatisfaction among a population, or some sort of significant 'disruptive event' occurs to jar people loose from their customary way of thinking that collective behavior begins to take hold.
31
Other scholars see a society more as a living system, full of interrelated parts and necessary interactions that work together to meet the needs of the system as a whole, rather than simply seeing it in terms of group interactions. Neil Smelser, an emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, follows this 'structural fundamentalism' view, and as such places more value in examining social movements and collective behavior as a function of tensions and issues that arise in the social structure of society. 32 Therefore he sees collective behavior not as a result of grievances, but instead as an indication that some aspect of society needs to change. He believes that these beliefs are a result of more than a simple cause-effect relationship outlined by Blumer, and acknowledges that collective behavior is a result of multiple causal factors. 33 This indication that social movements and collective behavior emerge from the interaction of numerous factors and inputs continues to be explored through the literature.
Eminent American sociologists J.D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald pioneered the Resource
Mobilization Theory, (RMT) which indicates that grievances and societal unrest alone are insufficient to explain social movements. Groups require the 'means' by which to act if they want to enact change.
34
These resources may be tangible (money, participants, leaders) or intangible (skills, public support), but the acquisition of these resources helps explain the success or failure of social movements, as well as to 31 Edwards, [18] [19] 32 Tarrow, 17. 33 Edwards, [33] [34] [35] Ibid., 43.
partially define their function and operation. 35 Together they focused almost completely on the organizations themselves, giving great credit to the structural, organizational, and behavioral facets of organizations, but paid less attention to what the movements actually do.
36
RMT draws a lot of support from Rational Action Theory (RAT), which would indicate that participants join social movements out of a rational decision-making process rather than an irrational jump to emotionally charged action. Because social movements usually operate outside of the political system, their resources are scarce and costs high. They must work to maximize the benefits they can achieve from the limited resources available. 37 RAT brings the discussion of costs, benefits, and interests into the field of social movements, and provides room to discuss the idea of collective action problems.
Gerald Marwell and Pamela E. Oliver define collective action as action that is undertaken by two or more individuals in pursuit of collective goods, or public benefits gained through action. 38 Because these goods are public in nature, and arguably any individual contribution to the action is minimal, there emerges what is called the collective action problem. Since the goods are public, and because the costs of contributing far outweigh the benefits of enjoying the goods as a free rider, RAT indicates that it would be rational for individuals to abstain from supporting a social movement, and enjoy the fruits of the movement as a non-actor. 39 Previous scholarship indicates that emotion and ideology are both irrational and insufficient to invoke participation, so Mancur Olson and others infer that there are certain conditions that must be present in order to make participation in a movement attractive to a rational actor.
40
Participation in collective action generally comes through one or more of three possible conditions: social sanctions, selective incentives, and critical mass. Tarrow, 10. 47 Edwards, 80. 48 Edwards, 82. much of the impetus behind social movements in the interaction between contention and changes in political regimes, as well as the broad influence of both political conflict and regime change. 50 This is not too far removed from the original thoughts of Marx and Engels, who believed that collective action was bound to occur when a social class comes into fully developed contradiction with its antagonists. 51 The difference between these two ideas is that Tilley seeks to explore how this friction helps shape social movements, while Marx and Engels simply see the friction as a necessary ingredient of collective action.
These same three scholars later moved beyond the basics of PPT, acknowledging the need for a more dynamic analysis of social movements. They realized that there needed to be more focus on the interactions among the varied factors addressed by other scholars. In doing so they coined the field of contentious politics, which they initially defined as: "…episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, it realized, affect the interests of at least one of the Edwards, 106. examining the broader relations among movements, parties, and states. 54 The proponents of contentious politics saw three main mechanisms that determine the processes that ultimately shape social movements.
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilley define these mechanisms into three broad categories: environmental, dispositional, and relational.
Environmental mechanisms are those externally generated influences on the conditions that affect social life, such as the effect of resource availability on the capacity to engage in contentious politics.
Dispositional mechanisms involve altering individual and collective perceptions, while relational mechanisms alter the connections between people, groups, and interpersonal networks. is what allows local episodes to become national issues, and national issues to achieve international recognition.
62
Finally, the mechanism of repression, defined as actions by authorities that increase the cost of an actor's claim making, is often a significant threat to movements.
63 Repression tends to stiffen resistance by well-organized, targeted communities, and discourages diffusion and mobilization by other parties.
64
Taken together, these mechanisms highlighted in contentious politics lend themselves directly to the current situation in Yemen. As McAdam et al indicate, governments alter their organizations, policies, and priorities in response to their participation in contentious politics. 65 Just as important, the government itself helps to shape the interactions in contentious politics. The situation in Yemen is more than just a social movement -it is a series of mechanisms and processes that have played out in broad strokes though the process of the National Dialogue Committee and subsequent decision to enact a federal system in Yemen. Through a series of interactions with Al-Hiraak over issues of southern mistreatment, the government of Yemen has agreed to literally alter its basic composition and to provide increased autonomy for subnational regions. Al-Hiraak has likewise altered some of its priorities, as it has downplayed the demand for secession and actively participated in the NDC.
Yemen Case Study
In order to explain the utility of social movement theory, specifically through the use of contentious politics, in explaining the birth and development of Al-Hiraak, it is necessary to undergo a brief analysis of the history of Yemen. This analysis will outline the historical events that led to the development of the movement, and indicate how the theory of contentious politics can both explain the movement's past trajectory, and finally provide some predictive capabilities for its future. It will also identify some trends that can help explain the likely effects of federalization on the movement, and on the security situation in Yemen.
A close examination of the history of Al-Hiraak includes visible effects of two major themes in contentious politics -repression and co-optation. Government repression, and the subsequent reaction of both Al-Hiraak, and other protest elements, largely shaped the growth and expansion of the movement.
Co-optation through deliberate inclusion in the National Dialog Council (NDC) is likely to shape its future. In order to explain how these themes play out in the formation and expansion of Al-Hiraak, it is necessary to review the fractious history of Yemen that led to the movement's development. Saleh, who remained the head of newly united nation. 73 Oddly, the two militaries never fully integrated.
Although some senior commanders and individual units were exchanged across the former border, there remained two distinctly separate militaries in Yemen. This situation was not rectified until the end of the 1994 civil war.
74
Despite these hasty efforts to balance power, the unification of Yemen brought with it some significant issues. Chief among these issues was the misbalance of power towards the executive branch.
The executive authority of the government was made up of a five-person body, three of which were from 70 Day, "Yemen: On The Brink," 4. 71 Phillips, "Yemen," 767. 72 Ibid. 73 Day, "Yemen: On The Brink," 4. 74 Phillips, "Yemen," 767.
the north, and two from the south. 75 This allowed President Saleh and his northern partners to exert undue influence on state matters, a fault that significantly contributed to future debacles.
Beyond the formal political processes that favored the north and threatened the stability of the newly formed country, informal patterns of behavior also caused friction between the north and the south.
Under decades of British colonial rule, and under the subsequent Marxist government of the liberated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the people of the south grew accustomed to a fairly legitimate, functioning government. They were shocked by the levels of corruption and nepotism engrained in Saleh's administration, and as a whole unprepared to compete in such an environment.
76
Not long after the initial unification, these political stressors came to a head in Yemen. The first national election, held in 1993, resulted in a painful political stalemate as northern and southern parties all failed to win a national majority or to establish a dominating presence in parliament. Strong regional performances by Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) in the north and the YSP in the south led to demands from YSP leaders for a federal system that would grant them decentralized political power to rule in the south. Saleh and the GPC equated any call for federal status as the first step towards succession, and adamantly rejected these requests.
77
Despite an attempt by King Hussein of Jordan to diffuse the situation through the signing of an official Document of Pledge and Accord (DPA), tensions continued to mount between the north and the south. 78 During the struggles more than 100 YSP politicians were assassinated, allegedly by returning veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war working at the behest of the Saleh regime. 79 In April 1994 the situation eventually devolved into a brief civil war, where the still-unincorporated northern and southern 75 Day, "Yemen: On The Brink," 4.
76 Susanne Dahlgren, "The Snake with a Thousand Heads: The Southern Cause in Yemen," Middle East Report no. 256 (Fall 2010): 32 77 Day, "Yemen: On The Brink," 5. 78 Ibid. 79 Dahlgren, "The Snake with a Thousand Heads," 29.
armies clashed in a series of engagements across the country. The war ended on July 7, 1994 when the northern army sacked the port city of Aden, forcing most of the YSP leadership to flee the country.
80
The outcome of the 1994 civil war arguably provided much of the friction that eventually led to the rise of Al-Hiraak as a political movement. In the aftermath of the war and the exodus of senior YSP leadership, the party found itself significantly weakened and ineffective. The YSP chose to boycott the 1997 parliamentary elections in protest against Saleh and his leadership, but their absence only allowed the GPC to secure a clear majority in parliament. This majority gave them the opportunity to sever its coalition with another major political party, and effectively assume complete control of the government. to increase the cost of claim-making through repressive tactics can, rather than dissuading further action, actually stiffen the resistance of the targeted organization. 85 Gasim, "Explaining Political Activism in Yemen," 121. 86 Dahlgren, "The Snake with a Thousand Heads," 28. 87 Gasim, "Explaining Political Activism in Yemen," 121. 88 Day, "Yemen: On The Brink," 9. 89 Ibid., 122.
Although Al-Hiraak had many potential allies in north Yemen amongst those tired of the brutal, corrupt government, it failed to gain significant traction in that region of the country. The initial grievances that drive the formation of the organization are well recognized throughout the country, and many northerners also felt slighted by the Saleh regime during his reign. But Al-Hiraak's adamant desire for secession, coupled with a disjointed organization that lacked strong, unified leadership, prevented them from potentially larger gains in the north.
90
In January 2011 Yemen experienced its own version of the Arab Spring uprisings, as young activists began marching and demonstrating in support of the Tunisian efforts that eventually ousted Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Faced again with immediate initial repression from the Saleh regime, the protests quickly diffused across the country, demanding political reforms and a change of presidential leadership.
Although the initial spark for these protests came from events in Tunisia and Egypt, the form and execution of the protests drew significantly from the rise of Al-Hiraak several years earlier. These new protests largely consisted of empowered youth activists, unaffiliated with any particular political party, but aware that civil protests had the potential to bring about significant political reform.
91
Much like the roots of Al-Hiraak, the Arab Spring protests in Yemen attracted a very broad base of organizations calling for political change in the country. While the initial root of the movement largely came from unaffiliated youth activists, it quickly grew to include dozens of other elements. Many of these elements were overtly political or ideological, such as a bloc aligned with the Zaydi interests in the north, Nasserists, Socialist organizations, and members of Islah, an islamist-based political organization.
92
Elements of Al-Hiraak also participated in the Arab Spring protests, adding yet another political dimension to the fray. 90 Ibid. 91 Gasim, "Explaining Political Activism in Yemen," 110. Shortly thereafter, the ruling GPC and larger opposition parties negotiated an agreement through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This agreement was finalized in November 2011 and allowed Saleh to step down from power peacefully, to be replaced by his vice president, in exchange for immunity against any charges of abuse during the protests. 94 The initiative also allowed for the formation of a National Dialogue Committee (NDC) intended to bring together the various regional and political factions of Yemen in order to agree on the formation of a new government. The NDC exposed elements of AlHiraak to legitimate centers of governmental power, an opportunity that they had been largely excluded from in the past. The exposure of previously excluded political actors to centers of power often leads to co-optation, where that actor's demands tend to soften over time.
Even though it successfully removed President Saleh from power, Al-Hiraak largely did not support the GCC initiative. In an attempt to secure some legitimate political power for the protesters, the initiative included a provision that the new government be shared equally between the ruling GPC and the opposition parties. However much of Al-Hiraak believed that this provision completely ignored their core demand, their desire to separate wholly from the north and reestablish an independent south Yemen. This exposed some serious divisions within the movement itself, as those who demanded secession openly 93 Bonnefoy and Poirier, "Dynamics," 241.
94 Bonnefoy and Poirier, "Dynamics, [241] [242] clashed in February 2012 with elements who believed that their main grievances could be addressed under the auspices of a Yemen united under a new government.
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Despite these internal divisions, some members of Al-Hiraak continued to participate in the NDC.
The NDC established a special committee, known as the "8+8" committee, to specifically negotiate an agreement with Al-Hiraak over their grievances. This committee, made up of eight senior leaders from the north and eight from the south, proved to be essential in reaching a consensus that is acceptable to both Al-Hiraak and the rest of the NDC. 96 Thanks in no small part to the work of this committee, the NDC announced in February 2014 Yemen would transform into a six-region federal system. The sixregion agreement addressed the majority of southern desires for increased autonomy, and also assuaged northern fears that a two-federation split along north-south lines would merely be a precursor to full independence for the south in the near future.
97
As demonstrated above, the root cause behind Al-Hiraak grew out of northern repression of southern interests following the 1994 civil war. Saleh and the GPC overwhelmingly dominated the political scene, using executive power to marginalize all other political opponents and parties. This repression took many forms -political, social, economic, and even reached into the military ranks.
Following the conclusion of the civil war, President Saleh forced significant portions of the former South Yemen army to retire under unfavorable circumstances. These former officers were unable to find new employment, and received only paltry recompense for their years of prior service. In 2007 they began the protest campaign that eventually grew into Al-Hiraak. Government repression of Al-Hiraak, especially in incidents like the October 14, 2007 massacre by government forces, only served to strengthen the movement's resolve and widen its recruiting base. 95 Gasim, "Explaining Political Activism in Yemen," 128-129.
96 Rafat Al-Akhali, "Debating Federalism in Yemen," Yemen Times, November 7, 2013, accessed May 13, 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1753/opinion/3452/Will-decentralization-in-Yemen-marginalizecitizens.htm.
97 "Yemen to Become Six-Region Federation," Naharnet Newsdesk, February 10, 2014, accessed 31 July 2014, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/118033-yemen-to-become-six-region-federation.
Al-Hiraak played both a direct and indirect role in the 2011 Arab Springs uprisings in Yemen.
Indirectly they served as an influence for the movement as a result of their years of political protest and action. Directly they took part in many of the major protests, joining up with other protest groups that shared their dislike for the current regime. They suffered the same violent repression as the other Arab Springs elements, and again found their resolve hardened and support widened. It was exactly this heavyhanded government repression that led to the intervention of the GCC, the removal of Saleh, and the establishment of the NDC that eventually enacted the six-region federal system.
The deliberate inclusion of Al-Hiraak in the NDC exposed what had been a politically marginalized movement to previously inaccessible elements of power. This exposure to power fundamentally alters protest movements, often changing them from movements to mere interest groups.
98
The groups find that, once they are provided a measure of legitimate power, they are able to address many of their driving issues. While the outcomes are generally not as extreme as the core of the movement may desire, they are often sufficient to satisfy the rank-and-file. Once the major issues are at least partially addressed, the movement finds itself less in the role of a protest organization and more in the role of an advocate for continued power. full independent status. The movement even reorganized its internal mechanisms to better represent the needs of its constituency in the light of this opportunity.
101
Following this fracture, Al-Hiraak announced that it would be willing to discuss options for the creation of a federal system in Yemen, essentially tabling the cry for independence. Their initial terms demanded a two-region federal state, again drawn along the pre-unification lines. These terms remained a sticking point at the NDC, as many feared that a two-region federal system would merely set the stage for complete independence of the southern region in the near future.
102 Faced with another potential stalemate and eager to pursue a workable solution, the chairman of Al-Hiraak, Mohammed Ali Ahmed, announced that the party ruled out the demands for a two-region federal state in late October 2013. 103 This decision ultimately set the stage for the final agreement on the creation of a six-region federal state, announced in January 2014. This final agreement addressed many of the concerns that originally drove Al-Hiraak to call for independence, gave them a legitimate voice in the government, and provided them access to power that had been denied to them for years.
The mechanics of co-optation help explain how the NDC ultimately succeeded in brokering a deal among the many political and regional parties in Yemen, by providing them with access to power that eventually softens their core demands and provides legitimate opportunities for power. These same mechanics of co-optation also likely contain significant predictive power for the future of Al-Hiraak.
Because Al Hiraak participated in the NDC, they were able to exercise new levels of political power. This new power played a significant role in the decision to move to a six-region federal system, a move that addresses, at least on some levels, many of the movement's core issues. Therefore it is likely that those members of Al-Hiraak who still strive for secession and full independence will slowly be marginalized from the rest of the movement, who will be happy to exercise their newfound political influence in the federal system. Over time, the calls for independence are likely to die down, as its proponents will find fewer and fewer supporters among a population that no longer lives under the grievances that gave root to the movement.
Conclusion
"Dealing with the Southern Movement simply as a security threat linked to the problem of terrorism, without addressing the underlying political problems that gave rise to it, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy." In this case study the mechanics of repression served only to strengthen and sharpen the core movement, exactly the opposite of what the sitting government intended. The movement remained a significant threat to internal stability only so long as it was forbidden from holding any real political power. When Al-Hiraak received the opportunity to wield power and influence in the NDC, and became a legitimate agent in Yemen, they gained a real stake in the success of the political process. Consequently they modified their official agenda, distanced themselves from their most strident calls for secession, and eventually supported the formation of a six-region federal system. Therefore, the mechanism of cooptation gave Al-Hiraak access to power they lacked in the past, and this access both tempered their demands and significantly lessened their threat to the internal stability of Yemen.
The future adaptation of a federal system in Yemen is likely to have a two-fold effect. First, as discussed above, the inclusion of Al-Hiraak in the new government and the increased autonomy brought about by the federal system should eliminate many of the significant regional issues that plague Yemen.
While there are likely to be an uncomfortable period of transition of responsibilities from the central government to the regional states, in the long run this move should help quell much of the internal dissent in the country. This can allow the government to dedicate more time and effort to the ongoing Huthi rebellion in the north, a rebellion that now appears to be the biggest threat to a peaceful governmental transition following the conclusion of the NDC.
Policy Recommendations for Secession Movements
Learning from this, policymakers may want to encourage the development of security and governance starting from somewhere other than the central government. Yemen, much like Afghanistan, is a country that does not have a history of a strong centralized power. Efforts to develop a strong centralized government may be misplaced at best, and counterproductive at worst. Concentrating assistance and power at a level that is unable to adequately address the governance needs of a nation may in fact only exacerbate existing internal problems, and allow internal divisions to fester. Governments then must often rely on repressive tactics in an attempt to control their populations and quell potential uprisings. The hardening of Al Hiraak's demands for secession in the face of heavy-handed government reactions show that this technique can backfire on a government. If, on the other hand, assistance efforts take a more decentralized focus, and encourage the host government to do the same, they can help assuage some of the friction between the population and the government before they lead to larger issues.
Second, the federal system will bring with it a requisite increase in regional autonomy and a decentralization of governmental power that will allow the regional governments to better meet the needs of their constituents. This increased ability to provide governance, combined with a general decrease in upheaval between the government and population is likely to significantly curtail AQAP's maneuver space in Yemen. 105 Therefore, the move to decentralize power from the central government may actually serve to better achieve United States interests in Yemen (reduction of threat from AQAP) than years of military aid and targeted interventions.
Implications for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
The history of Al Qaeda in Yemen predates that of Al Hiraak by nearly three decades. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Yemen's internal security apparatus allowed the FBI access to two prisoners that they had previously refused to allow to be interviewed. governance capabilities as soon as they come to power in a region. 125 This shows that the organization is learning from previous failures and focusing future efforts more on gaining popular support than the simple exercise of brute power that has been used in the past.
126
Looking back at the history of Al Qaeda in Yemen, it becomes clear that the organization has consistently leveraged the space made available between a centralized government that is largely unable to consistently project power and extend governance to its population. Early on, the forefathers of the organization exploited the friction in the newly unified state, and found a role working with Saleh's government to shore up his power and fight communist elements in the southern part of the country. They enjoyed a relative sort of safe haven in the country, even during some of their initial attacks on United
States interests, until the massive shock of the 9/11 attacks inexorably altered the international political landscape, and Saleh was forced to throw in with United States' efforts against terrorist organizations. States' efforts and attention shifted primarily to Iraq, the group again found its way back in to Yemen.
Capitalizing on the distraction caused by the growing threat of the Huthi rebellion in the north, Al Qaeda leadership reestablished a significant presence in their old stronghold. During the recent turbulence caused by the Arab Springs and escalation of the secession movement in the south, AQAP took their presence a step further, and began actively controlling large swaths of territory. They targeted security forces, intimidated the population, and attempted to sell themselves as allies of those seeking redress against the government. Despite their efforts, they never fully gained the cooperation of large portions of the population. And once the government achieved some breathing room by deescalating conflict with the Huthis and entering into formal negotiations with Al Hiraak, it was able to recapture much of that territory from AQAP, often with the assistance of local tribal fighters.
This also indicates an awareness of a vulnerability that the government of Yemen, and United
States policy, should seek to exploit. President Hadi and his government should continue to press the offensive against AQAP strongholds across Yemen, but must pair their military actions with visible efforts to provide aid and services to regions of the country that have long been neglected by the government. As the transition to a six state federal system continues, dissemination of aid and services may be complicated by new levels of bureaucracy; nevertheless efforts to promote governance and provide services to the citizens of Yemen will continue to shrink AQAP's recruiting base and deny them support.
Counterterrorism Policy Recommendations for Yemen and Beyond
The United States economic and military support to Yemen should likewise focus on advancing Yemeni efforts to combat AQAP through military training and supplies, and should strive to minimize the use of drone strikes against AQAP targets. Many experts agree that, while the drone strikes have successfully eliminated a significant number of AQAP leadership, they also serve as a strong recruiting tool for the organization. The strikes often kill unaffiliated civilians travelling or meeting with AQAP members, and tribal law often requires surviving family members to avenge their loss. These traditions, along with the significant press coverage of drone strikes in Yemen, make them a hazardous tool in the fight against AQAP.
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Economic aid can be used to encourage Yemen's government to continue efforts to spread governance and services to its citizens. However, this must be done with realistic expectations as to just how effective their government can be in pushing development. Rather than using United States personnel and resources, or relying on a government that is not fully able to administer relief efforts, the 127 In a similar fashion, the government of Iraq should be wary of repressive action against those elements of the Sunni population that are currently cooperating with IS. When a portion of the population is both denied a voice in the government, and repressed by the same government, it is likely to strengthen its resolve rather than dissipate. This occurred when Saleh's government cracked down on Al-Hiraak's early protests, and led them to call for complete secession. Similarly, continued systematic repression of 128 Terrill, "The Struggle for Yemen," 83.
the Sunni population will only increase their dissatisfaction with the current government of Iraq, and drive them towards further cooperation with IS.
